This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; Part I. Describing the Economic Vote in Western Democracies: 2. Defining and measuring the economic vote; 3. Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies; 4. Estimation, measurement, and specification; Part II. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals: 5. Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting; 6. What do voters know about economic variation and its sources?; 7. Political control of the economy; Part III. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting: 8. Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote; 9. The distribution of responsibility and economic voting; 10. The pattern of contention and the economic vote; Part IV. Conclusion and Summary: 11. Conclusion.
