This book considers the proper nature and scope of criminal responsibility in the light of its institutional
and political role. Tadros begins by providing a general account of criminal responsibility which is based on the
relationship between the action that the defendant has performed and his or her character. He then moves on to
reconsider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of that account.
Part 1 examines the nature of criminal responsibility by exploring what it means for an agent to be responsible
for an action, and the constraints that there are on holding an agent criminally responsible which arise from the
particular social and institutional role that the criminal law has. Tadros develops a character theory of criminal
responsibility. Character, he argues, is relevant both in determining which actions an agent is responsible for,
as well as the kind of fault that he has in respect of those actions. However, he shows some limitations in the
character theory of criminal responsibility as it has been defended to date, developing a version that is not susceptible
to the central objections that have been levelled at character theories. Finally, Part 1 investigates the structure
oi criminal responsibility, considering the distinction between offence and defence, and investigating how best
to categorise and structure defences.
In Part 2 Tadros moves on to consider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of
the general theory developed in Part 1. He examines the proper nature and role of causation and investigates whether
there is a general principle of criminal omissions. The book then explores the nature and rolethat intentions and
beliefs ought to have in a theory of criminal responsibility. Tadros also provides an account of different kinds
of defence: exemptions, justifications, and excuses. The book includes a thorough account of the different ways
in which mental disorders might ground defences, the different kinds of normative standards that the criminal law
ought to set in offence and defence contexts, and whether particular deficiencies of the accused ought to be accommodated
in setting those standards.
About the Author:
Victor Tadros is Professor of Law at the University of Warwick
